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Abstract
Introduction: Many countries from the European region, which moved from a government financed and provided
health system to social health insurance, would have had the risk of moving away from universal health coverage if
they had followed a “traditional” approach. The Eastern European high-income countries studied in this paper managed
to avoid this potential pitfall by using state budget revenues to explicitly pay health insurance contributions on behalf of
certain (vulnerable) population groups who have difficulties to pay these contributions themselves.
The institutional design aspects of their government revenue transfer arrangements are analysed, as well as their impact
on universal health coverage progress.
Methods: This regional study is based on literature review and review of databases for the performance assessment. The
analytical framework focuses on the following institutional design features: rules on eligibility for contribution
exemption, financing and pooling arrangements, and purchasing arrangements and benefit package design.
Results: More commonalities than differences can be identified across countries: a broad range of groups eligible for
exemption from payment of health insurance contributions, full state contributions on behalf of the exempted groups,
mostly mandatory participation, integrated pools for both the exempted and contributors, and relatively
comprehensive benefit packages. In terms of performance, all countries have high total population coverage rates, but
there are still challenges regarding financial protection and access to and utilization of health care services, especially
for low income people.
Conclusion: Overall, government revenue transfer arrangements to exempt vulnerable groups from contributions are
one option to progress towards universal health coverage.
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Introduction
Several countries from Central and Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union moved from a government
financed and provided health system (Semashko model)
to social health insurance (SHI) and introduced payroll
taxes in the early 1990s (the full list of abbreviations can
be found at the beginning of the document) [1]. Prior to
this transition, they were characterized by high levels of
financial protection and equity in access [2]. This reform
would have had the risk of moving away from universal
population coverage if implementation had followed a
“traditional” SHI approach that would focus on the formal
sector employees and their dependents only. The countries
covered in this paper mostly managed to avoid this poten-
tial pitfall as they transitioned to a contributory health
insurance system [3]. In a “traditional” SHI, those not con-
tributing are not covered by the SHI (and thus only access
state provided health services). But certain population
groups are too poor to pay insurance contributions them-
selves and they need to be exempted from payment of
health insurance contribution in order to remain entitled
for health services. Thus, the government budget was the
starting point for health financing, and state budget trans-
fers were built into the design of the introduction of
earmarked payroll taxes right from the start in nearly all
countries. In fact, an increasing number of governments
across the globe decide to use general government reve-
nues, i.e. state budget transfers, to explicitly pay the contri-
butions on behalf of non-contributing population groups,
most often in addition to cross-subsidization from within
the fund’s contribution, because they realised that progress
towards universal health coverage (UHC) is not possible
via payroll taxes of contributors only. This arrangement
is also frequently captured and termed as government
subsidization of insurance contributions, usually for
economically inactive, vulnerable and poor population
groups depending on the context [3–7]. Vulnerable
groups can be defined as “groups whose demographic,
geographic, or economic characteristics impede or pre-
vent their access to health care services” ([8], p. 253).
The specific focus on such budget transfer/subsidization
arrangements via some form of health insurance, however,
does not suggest that this financing arrangement is the only
path to move towards or deepen UHC. One way is to
expand user fee exemptions for specific groups, often also
called free health-care policies for selected services and/or
selected population groups, such as in Africa primarily.
Other countries in Eastern and Central Europe and Central
Asia have done so without payroll taxes, even though some
of them established a separate purchasing agency, such as
Latvia. These approaches tend not to be based on the affili-
ation and enrolment of entitled individuals. In the past,
another group of countries tried to rely solely on payroll
taxes and SHI to expand coverage without any state budget
transfers. But a growing number of countries, both globally
as well as in the European region, is applying a mix of
contributory and non-contributory approach, by having
chosen the path of government subsidization/government
budget transfers to a health insurance type system. This
deserves a specific analysis which is what this paper chose
as its explicit focus.
The paper’s aim is to analyse the institutional design fea-
tures of these government revenue transfer arrangements
to SHI funds that serve to cover non-contributors in the
health insurance systems, with a particular emphasis on
those outside the formal sector, many of them being the
poor and other vulnerable population groups, although it is
difficult to separate these from other population groups
that are also eligible for contribution exemption. For short-
ening purpose, from now on we refer to them as “vulner-
able groups” or “the exempted”. The regional focus of this
paper is on Eastern European high-income countries (as
per World Bank country income classification [9]).
The existing body of literature contains single country
studies, assessing SHI and government subsidization
arrangements in particularly or discussing these as part
of a broader health system review. Kutzin et al. [10]
provide a comprehensive assessment of health financing
reforms of former Eastern Bloc countries. Taking it from
there, this paper explores in detail the specific institu-
tional design features of SHI arrangements that incorp-
orate government revenue transfer and assesses the
progress and achievements or setbacks as to UHC. UHC
means that “all people have access to services and do
not suffer financial hardship paying for them” ([7], p. 9).
The performance assessment also includes a comparison
between contributors and the exempt population groups.
As a result, those critical institutional design features that
are particularly conductive for UHC progress are identi-
fied. This analysis reveals that these financing arrange-
ments are indeed one option to progress towards UHC.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. The
next section outlines the applied methods and describes
the analytical framework to research institutional design,
as well as UHC related indicators to assess the perform-
ance of these financing arrangements. Section 3 presents
findings, which is followed by a discussion of poten-
tial effects of specific institutional design aspects as
well as of challenges on progress towards UHC in
Section 4. The last section concludes with policy lessons.
Methods
This paper’s focus is on high-income Eastern European
countries of the World Health Organization (WHO)
European Region that introduced payroll taxation as a
new earmarked tax for a new system of compulsory
health insurance combined with government revenue
transfers for non-contributors. These countries are
Vilcu and Mathauer International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:7 Page 2 of 19
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia, which were part of the former
Eastern Bloc and which have turned into high-income
countries over the past years, i.e. that were classified so
for at least four consecutive years since 2008 [11]. This
paper thus complements a paper by Mathauer et al.
[12] of the same subject on low- and middle-income
countries of the WHO European Region and is part of
a series of regional studies and a global review all with
the same research focus on state budget transfer/gov-
ernment subsidization arrangements.
To include or exclude countries in the study, in a first
step, former Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries of the
WHO European Region which have entered the group
of high-income countries and for which the Global
Health Expenditure Database indicated social security
expenditure in 2012 were selected. In a second step,
based on literature screening, countries were included
if and when the SHI system was combined with govern-
ment budget transfers for non-contributors. Once this
list of countries was established, a detailed literature
search was undertaken for each country in Science
Direct, JSTOR, PubMed and Google. In Google, the
first five pages, with ten results per page, were screened
for publications and grey literature from universities,
non-governmental organizations, governments, inter-
national organisations and alike. In the case of the
other databases the first 100 findings were screened. In
addition, the most recent Health Systems in Transition
publications were used. For the institutional design
analysis, the following search term combinations were
used: health system OR health financing OR health
insurance OR health vulnerable OR budget transfer OR
government revenue transfer OR health subsid* AND
the respective country AND/OR fund’s name.
The literature search for the performance assessment
was based on the following search term combinations:
health insurance coverage OR out-of-pocket payments
(OOP) OR catastrophic health expenditure OR impov-
erish* health care OR financial protection OR access
health OR utilization health care OR universal cover-
age AND the respective country AND/OR fund’s
name. Furthermore, data was also collected from the
WHO (for population size and OOP as a share of total
health expenditure (THE)), Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (for the
total population coverage rates) and Eurostat (for the
share of unmet need) databases, as well as other
country statistics.
The analytical framework used to assess institutional
design of government subsidization arrangements is
guided by the health financing functional approach
of Kutzin [13] and looks specifically at the following
aspects:
1. Revenue collection:




3. Purchasing arrangements and benefit package design.
The actual design features in place around these func-
tions are the result of explicit or implicit policy choices.
Building upon the World Health Report’s UHC
conceptualization, progress towards UHC is assessed by
looking at changes and improvement in the following
three indicators: 1) Population coverage, understood as
affiliation to the health financing arrangement under
study here; 2) financial protection; and 3) access to and
utilization of needed health care services [14]. Table 1
outlines our framework and provides an overview of the
institutional design aspects and related policy choices. It
also shows how these potentially relate to and affect pro-
gress toward UHC. A detailed explanation of these insti-
tutional design aspects and indicators can be found in
Additional file 1.
Results
Country and system overview
The analysis focuses on seven Eastern European countries,
namely Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Table 2 provides a summary
overview of countries. Prior to the system transition of the
1990s, these countries were classified as middle-income
countries. During the Soviet Union era, their health systems
was based on the Semashko model [15–19] with heavy
centralist planning and state owned and financed health
facilities ensured high levels of financial protection and
equity in access [2].
As part of the transition and health financing re-
forms, and with the aim to increase resource
mobilization as a reaction to economic and state
budget challenges, most countries introduced (and a
few re-established) payroll taxation for a new system
of compulsory SHI. Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovakia and Slovenia coupled this with government
revenue transfers in the early or mid-1990s, and
Poland and Estonia did so in 1999 [20]. In a way, the
shift to a SHI system made entitlement in principle
contingent upon contributions, or payment of these
by the state on behalf of those exempted. Yet, this link
between contribution on behalf of the state and entitle-
ment is often less explicit, like in Hungary or Czech Re-
public [21].
In a first step, entitlement to the health insurance
coverage is based on permanent residence (Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) or
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Table 1 Institutional design features of government revenue transfer/government subsidization
Institutional design aspect Related policy choices Intermediate output indicators UHC related performance
indicators
Eligibility and enrolment rules
Groups eligible for exemption from contributions/subsidization Definition of vulnerability (e.g. children,
unemployed, pregnant women, informal
sector workers, poor, near poor)
Share of the eligible among the bottom
two income quintiles and other vulnerable
groups
Total population coverage
(comprehensiveness of the health
insurance system), differentiated
along income quintiles
Targeting method E.g. universal (based on a very broad
criterion such as residence or no
employment in the formal sector),
indirect (based on socio-demographic,
socio-economic or geographic
characteristics usually correlated with
poverty and vulnerability), direct (through
a means assessment or proxy means testing);
different targeting approaches can be in place
at the same time for different groups
Share of the exempted/subsidized within
total (insured) population; Share of the
exempted/subsidized among those being
targeted for exemption/subsidization
(targeting effectiveness of the system)
Enrolment process Active enrolment by the beneficiary or
automatic enrolment by the authorities
Organization responsible for identification of the
exempted non-contributors/the subsidized
E.g., insurance company; central, regional,
local government
Type of enrolment/membership Mandatory or voluntary
Financing arrangements
Degree of subsidization/co-contribution Full or partial (a co-contribution is required) Share of the exempted/subsidized within
total (insured) population/those being
targeted for subsidization (importance of
government revenue)
Type of transfer mechanism Individual-based (a specific amount is
being paid for each exempted individual)
or lump-sum (a lump sum transfer for the
entire exempted population is made)
Calculation logic to determine the amount being
transferred
E.g., based on regular contribution levels,
minimum or average wages, specific
percentage of the government budget,
negotiated by the government
Sufficient funding for a comprehensive
benefit package
Financial protection (incidence of
catastrophica/impoverishing health
expenditure), also differentiated
along income quintiles and other
aspects; Access to services
Level of cross-subsidization from
contributions
Source of government revenue transfers E.g. general government revenues,
earmarked government revenues,
transfers from other health insurance
funds or from contributors within the
















Table 1 Institutional design features of government revenue transfer/government subsidization (Continued)
Pooling arrangements
Type of pool(s) (general) Single fund or multiple funds Degree of fragmentation, Equity in access;
Type of pool (exempted/subsidized) Exempted/subsidized integrated into
existing fund(s) or separate fund for
the exempted/subsidized
Size and composition of pools, Equity in financing;
Type of health insurance affiliation/membership of the
contributors
Voluntary or mandatory Level of cross-subsidization Efficiency;
Financial protection
Purchasing arrangements and benefit package design
Range of services covered by the benefit package E.g. comprehensive, inpatient focus,
outpatient focus, pharmaceuticals,
dental care, indirect costs (e.g.
transportation)
Financial protection;
Different or same package as contributors Access (utilization rates);
Equity in accessDegree of cost-sharing Cost-sharing mechanisms (e.g., co-insurance,
co-payment, deductible) and rates
Provider payment mechanisms Type of provider payment and rates Efficiency
Same or different rules around provider
payment
aAs per the WHO definition, catastrophic expenditure “occurs when a household’s total out-of-pocket health payments equal or exceed 40 % of household’s capacity to pay” ([46], p. 4)















personal identification card (Hungary). As a second
condition, definition of specific groups eligible for
exemption from contributions are specified by law
[16–18, 22–24].
Eligibility and targeting to identify the exempted
For the European region, it is important to specify the
terminology of eligibility. Whereas in other regions, it is
appropriate to talk of the “subsidized”, the European
region requires some further terminological specifica-
tion. As everybody was covered prior to the transition,
the introduction of payroll taxes for formal sector
employees and a contributory SHI system implied that
various population groups needed to be exempted from
contributions while still remaining entitled. The transfer
of government revenues on behalf of and for the exempt
has also led to the term of the “state insured”.
An overview of eligibility rules for those exempted
from contributions in each country are provided in
Table 3, revealing strong commonalities as well as some
distinct differences in a few countries. The population
group most frequently exempted are the economically
inactive people [22]. The exempted or state insured need
to be distinguished from the insured family dependents
who are covered via their principal affiliate through the
principle of cross-subsidization by contributors. Family
dependents usually include non-working spouses and
children. Yet, in Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland, children are actually part of the state insured for
which the government provides explicit budget transfers.
While the categories of exempt persons are diverse, the
most common population groups include the unemployed,
pensioners, people receiving social assistance benefits, the
poor and children below 18 years. Even though military
personnel, who are employed by the Ministry of Defence,
may be not considered as vulnerable, they are exempted
from contributions in several countries (Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia and Hungary). Estonia stands out to some
extent: in addition to the groups for whom the government
transfers revenues to the insurance fund, several population
groups do not contribute and for which there is no state
budget transfer made to contribute on their behalf. These
encompass children up to 19 years, students, non-working
pregnant women, non-working spouses of insured individ-
uals, pensioners and disabled people entitled to special
pensions. As in Croatia prior to its 2002 reform as in many
Western European countries, this reflects the idea of insur-
ance coverage of family dependents being cross-subsidized
by the contributors.
Table 4 provides an overview of the targeting and
enrolment rules. Notably, most countries apply indirect
targeting to identify eligible individuals for contribution
exemption, based on socio-economic characteristics.
Only Hungary and Poland use a direct targeting
approach based on income means testing. The
organization responsible for the identification of eligible
population groups is most often the local government
authority. Nonetheless, the identified eligible need to
undertake active steps for their enrolment into the SHI
in several countries.
Financing arrangements
Two key health expenditure indicators related to the
financing arrangements are general government health
expenditure (GGHE) as a share of THE and expenditure
of SHI funds as a share of GGHE (Table 5).
GGHE as a share of THE is relatively high in 1995,
but decreases in all countries, reaching the lowest level
in Hungary at 64 % (from 84 % in 1995). The core
purchaser of health services are the SHI agencies, as at
least 80 % of GGHE is spent via them, and in three
countries, this share is above 90 %. This share has
mostly gone up, slightly though, in four of the seven
countries, ranging from 83 % in Hungary to 94 % in
Croatia. Importantly, this share includes the government
revenue transfers. While precise data is only available for
Table 2 Country overview




















Croatia 2008 4,3 13,597 19.5 1993 [20] 1993 [50]
Czech Republic 2006 10,5 19,858 8.6 1992 [51] 1992 [51]
Estonia 2006 1,3 18, 877 18.6 1992 [51] 1999 [16]
Hungary 2007 9,9 13,485 14.3 1990 [52] 1990 [52]
Poland 2009 38,5 13,653 17.3 1999 [51] 1999 [51]
Slovakia 2007 5,4 18.049 12.8 1994 [22] 1994 [22]
Slovenia 1997 2,1 23,295 14.5 1992 [23] 1992 [23]
Legend: GDP gross domestic product
aAt national poverty line
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Table 3 Eligible groups for exemption from contribution
Country Terminology used for
eligible groups




Croatia Vulnerable [50] Unemployed; War veterans; Yes [50] Mandatory [50]
Disabled persons; Militaries;
Children < 18 years; Pensioners with pensions below
the average net wage;
Students; Farmers above age 66 [28, 29]
Czech Republic State insured [24] Unemployed; Women taking care of one
child < 7 years or more
children < 15 years;
Yes [24] Mandatory [24]
Pensioners; Military personnel;
Children; Prisoners;
Students; People receiving social welfare;
Women or men on parental leave; Asylum seekers [31]
Estonia Insured covered by state [16] Individuals on parental leave with children < 3 years; Individuals exposed to nuclear
contamination, mainly related
to the Chernobyl nuclear accident;
Yes [16] Mandatory [16]
One non-working parent of children < 8 years; People receiving social benefits;
One parent in families with three
children < 19 years;
Dependent spouses of diplomats;
Carers of disabled people; Registered unemployed (entitlement
for 270 days) [16]
Military personnel;
Non-contributing insured people (almost half of insured people): children up to 19 years, pensioners,
disabled people entitled to special pensions, students, non-working spouses of insured individuals,
non-working pregnant women from the 12th week of pregnancy [16]
Hungary Non-contributing groups [17] Pensioners; People with disability; Yes [17] Mandatory [52]
Women on maternity leave; Children < 18 years;
People with very low income (including homeless persons); Students;
Military personnel; Roma population [17, 43, 52]
The dependants of all the above;
Poland Non-contributing groups [18] Children < 18 years; People not eligible for unemployment benefits; Yes [18] Mandatory [18]
Pregnant women; People with low income;
Individuals with disabilities; Soldiers;
People above age 65 without an old age
or disability pension;
Farmers;















Table 3 Eligible groups for exemption from contribution (Continued)
Slovakia State insured [22] Dependent children and their carers; Reservists; Yes [54] Mandatory [22]
Pensioners; Unemployed;
Job applicants not receiving any allowance; People on sick leave [22, 54]
Persons receiving disability benefits;
Slovenia No specific term [23] Individuals without income; Unregistered unemployed; Yes [23] Mandatory [23]
















Hungary, Slovakia and Estonia, general government
revenue transfer to the insurance funds do constitute an
important share in all countries. In Hungary, the share
of general government revenue as of total SHI funds is
largest (above 50 %) [25], followed by Slovakia (34 % in
2011) [26]. It is important to note though that budget
transfers are not necessarily linked only to finance the
non-contributors, but may equally serve to provide
funding to the whole pool of both contributors and non-
contributors. In Hungary, for example, it is also a means
to complement government taxation policy to reduce
contribution rates for the contributors. Estonia is an
exception again, as this share is approximately 5 %
only (in 2012) [27], given that the non-contributors
are largely cross-subsidized from contributors.
The institutional design features relating to the finan-
cing arrangements are presented in the first four columns
of Table 5. Importantly, in contrast to other regions, all
countries studied here fully exempt those considered as
unable to pay contributions, i.e. eligible for exemption,
and they do not co-contribute at all. This aspect is crucial,
because the collection of partial contributions from those
outside formal sector employment may be cumbersome
and potentially hinder vulnerable groups to get enrolled.
However, some groups outside the formal sector are
not eligible for exemption, i.e. no specific state budget
transfers are made on their behalf. These groups have to
make contributions and in some countries include the
registered unemployed, farmers, craftsmen, pensioners
and the self-employed.
Table 5 also presents the logic or formula of determin-
ing the amount of the state budget transfer for non-
contributors. In all countries but two, the government
transfer for the exempted is based on a per capita amount
that is formula-based. One exception is Hungary, where the
government transfers a lump sum that is largely a result of
budget negotiation processes [17]. This is also the case for
all non-contributors of Croatia except those who receive
unemployment benefits or pensions below the average net
wage.
Various types of calculation formula and logics are
found. First, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the
transfer amount is determined by applying a set rate to
the average wage, or as in Estonia, on an annually defined
amount. Yet, notably, in Slovakia, the contribution rate for
the contributing population is 14 % [22], whereas a rate of
4.78 % is applied for the exempt groups, pointing to cross-
subsidization from contributors to the exempt. Secondly,
in Poland, Croatia and Estonia, for social security benefi-
ciaries, such as pensioners and the unemployed, the trans-
fer amount is calculated by applying a set rate to social
security pension or unemployment benefits, even though
the source of funds are central government revenues,
except in Estonia. A third way is applied in Slovenia where
a fixed amount per capita is in place.
In all these countries, the transfer amount for the state
insured has hence little to do with the average contribu-
tion amount of the contributors. Yet, this is not the
objective. Different contribution rates applied to differ-
ent “contribution” bases for different population groups
within the same country are thus largely the result of
taxation policy considerations as well as feasibility con-
cerns. Importantly, these calculation formula are not
intended to reflect an actuarial-based contribution to
cover the exempted average expenditure. Instead, the
aim is to achieve a funding level, in combination with
contributions that cover the costs of care. Thus, in
some countries, government budget transfers serve to
“subsidize” all insured, whether contributing or not.
Regarding the source of transfers, all countries make
use of central government revenues. Only in Estonia are
unemployment funds the source of funds transferred for
the registered unemployed. Moreover, a few countries
make use of hypothecated taxes: in Croatia, since 2008,
Table 4 Targeting and enrolment rules
Country Targeting method applied Responsible organization
for identifying the eligible
Initiation of enrolment process
Croatia Indirect targeting [50] Local and central government [29] n/a
Czech Republic Indirect targeting [24] Central government [24] Active enrolment by the beneficiary [24]
Estonia Indirect targeting [16] Regional government [16] Automatic enrolment by authorities [16]
Hungary Indirect targeting and
direct targeting (means
testing) of people with
very low income [17]
Local government [17] Active enrolment by the beneficiary [52]
Poland Indirect targeting and
direct targeting (means
testing) of people with
low income [18]
Local government [18] n/a
Slovakia Indirect targeting [22] Local government [22] Active enrolment by the beneficiary [22]
Slovenia Indirect targeting [23] Local government [23] n/a
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the transfer amount for the
non-contributors
Transfer mechanism Financing source of
transfer
GGHE as % of THE [48] Expenditures of social health insurance fund
as % of GGHEa [48]
1995 Year prior to intro-duction
of govt budget transfers
2013 1995 Year prior to intro-duction
of govt budget transfers
2013
Croatia 100 % [28] Pensioners with pensions
below the average net wage:







86 n/a 80 95 n/a 94
Central and local
governments budget
for the rest [28]




The rest: lump sum decided
upon in the budget-making
process [20]
Czech Republic 100 % [24] Contribution rate of 13.5 %
applied to 25 % of the average
monthly wage two years prior





91 n/a 83 84 n/a 93
Estonia 100 % [16] For the registered unemployed:






90 86 (1998) 78 86 (1999) n/a 87




Hungary 100 % [17] Not specified [20] Lump sum [17] Central government
budget [17]
84 n/a 64 80 n/a 83






73 65 (1998) 70 84 (1999) 0 (1998) 86






89 n/a 70 96 n/a 90




78 n/a 72 94 n/a 93
Legend: GGHE general government health expenditure; THE total health expenditure















car insurance tax and 32 % of revenues from excise taxes
on tobacco are designated to health financing [28, 29].
Hungary also introduced earmarked taxes for health
financing, such as the fat taxes levied on foods with high
fat, sugar, salt and caffeine content [30].
Pooling arrangements
Strong commonalities in institutional design are found
with respect to pooling arrangements (Table 6). As the
countries transitioned and shifted from a universalist
Semashko system (covering all population groups) to a
compulsory SHI system, the most crucial feature is that
all countries built in universality and chose to establish
an integrated fund for both the contributors and non-
contributors with the aspiration and logic to again cover
the total population. While this followed the pre-transition
logic of coverage for all, setting up an integrated pool for all
population groups is not self-evident, as evidence from
other regions reveals.
This came along with another important policy choice,
namely to introduce mandatory coverage for all - both con-
tributors as well as non-contributors - except in Estonia
and Poland, where a few smaller population groups can ob-
tain insurance coverage on a voluntary basis.
Even though contributors and exempt are within the
same pool, there is fragmentation in some countries.
While Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia
have a single national pool, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia introduced a multiple payer system at a later
stage, with 9 funds [31] and 3 funds [22] respectively,
combined with a risk equalization mechanism. In the
Czech Republic, each health insurance fund collects the
SHI contributions from all its members, or receives state
budget transfers for the state insured. Individuals are
free to enrol in any health insurance fund and they have
the right to choose it once a year [24]. In 1994, the
government introduced a risk adjustment mechanism to
equalize available funds across insurers. The revenues
subject to the risk adjustment mechanism comprised
100 % of state transfers on behalf of the state insured
and 60 % of revenues from contributors. These funds
were redistributed among insurers taking into account
the number of state insured persons, further adjusted by
two age categories (below and above 60 years). Those
above 60 years of age are given a triple weight in the
risk adjustment formula [32]. Although this approach
allowed for more financial sustainability, it was inef-
fective because it did not eliminate incentives for risk
selection [32]. Thus, in the late 2000s, the risk adjust-
ment mechanisms was further modified, with 100 %
of revenues from contributions being subject to redis-
tribution and with a risk adjustment formula now
based on age and gender, and no longer on exemp-
tion status. This further reduced incentives for risk
selection [24].
In Slovakia, soon after the introduction of its SHI,
competition between non-profit insurers was introduced
[32]. Since 2010, after merging and various reforms in
the legal status of the funds, the system ended up having
three health insurance funds. Each collects SHI contri-
butions and receives government revenue transfers, and
individuals are free to enrol in any of them. A risk
adjustment mechanism has been set up, initially based
on an age- and gender-related risk index, which, since
2010, is applied in a differential way for the state insured
and the contributors. The different risk-adjusted alloca-
tions for different population groups result in certain
groups of the state insured being more attractive (e.g.,
students) than others (e.g., unemployed), possibly
increasing incentives for risk selection by insurers [22].
Table 6 Pooling arrangements
Country Single/multiple pool(s) Integrated/separated pool
for the exempt and contributors
Type of membership of contributors
Croatia Single: Croatian Health Insurance Institute [56] Integrated [56] Mandatory [50]
Czech Republic Multiple [24] Integrated [24] Mandatory [24]
Estonia Single: Estonian Health Insurance Fund [57] Integrated [57] Mandatory
Voluntary: residents who receive a pension from
abroad, unregistered unemployed, students
studying beyond normal length of study [16]
Hungary Single: Health Insurance Fund, administrated
by the National Health Insurance Fund
Administration [17]
Integrated [17] Mandatory [17]
Poland Single: National Health Fund [53] Integrated [18] Mandatory
Voluntary for employees on unpaid leave,
persons engaged in certain types of contract
work, volunteers [18]
Slovakia Multiple [22] Integrated [22] Mandatory [22]
Slovenia Single: Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia [23] Integrated [23] Mandatory [23]
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Purchasing arrangements and benefit package design
Since all countries operate integrated schemes for
both contributors and the exempt, provider payment
mechanisms and rates applied are the same for both
groups, thus giving providers no immediate incentive
for cream-skimming patients.
As Table 7 shows, in all the countries covered here, the
SHI benefit package is relatively comprehensive and cov-
ered health services are the same for both the non-
contributors and contributors. Where covered services of-
fered at private health care providers are included, access
for the state insured is the same as for contributors.
Although the range of covered health care benefits is
broad in all countries, cost-sharing mechanisms are in
place, with an overview provided in Table 8. However,
most countries provide cost-sharing exemptions for some
but not all state insured groups and non-contributors as
well as some groups among the contributors.
Assessment of UHC related performance indicators
Population coverage
This section seeks to explore how countries fared on
their path to universal health since they shifted to the
hybrid financing system of SHI and state budget
transfers. It starts by looking at total population enrol-
ment rates. The population enrolled in SHI as a share of
the whole population is above 99 % in 2 out of the 7
analysed countries (Czech Republic and Slovenia). For
the other countries their population coverage rate is
equally very high and above 90 % (see Table 9).
Data on the share of the exempt or state insured as of
the total population is not available for all countries.
Estimations suggest that the largest share is found in
Croatia (64 %), followed by Slovakia (approx. 62 %) and
the Czech Republic (58 %) [19]. Estonia has the lowest
share of 4.9 %, but this needs to be seen in addition to
the 45.8 % of the non-contributing population being
cross-subsidized by contributors. These figures indicate
the significance of exemption and non-contribution and
the importance of government revenue transfers.
An important question is which type of people are not
covered in the countries with a population coverage rate
below 100 % and whether they fall outside the eligible
groups for exemption or non-contribution. In fact,
people of Roma ethnic groups may be most likely to
remain uninsured. In 2011, 7 % of the Roma population
in the Czech Republic was not covered by the SHI [33],
9 % in Hungary [34], and 3 % in Slovakia respectively
[35]. However, these numbers are small in absolute
terms considering that the Roma population represents
approximately 3 % of the total population in the Czech
Republic [33] and 2 % in Hungary and Slovakia [26].
In Estonia, the long-term unemployed and men that
do not belong to the economically active population
between 30 and 50 years old are not part of the defined
eligible groups for non-contributions and are thus more
likely not to be insured [36]. In the richest income quin-
tile every tenth person was found to not have insurance,
whereas the probability of being uninsured is four times
higher among people in the lowest income quintile [16].
In Poland, approximately 1-2 % of the population,
namely the very poor, are uninsured. However, since
2004, regardless of insurance status, very poor people as
well as uninsured pregnant women and children below
18 years have access, though limited, to free publicly-
financed health services [37].
Finally, a very small percentage of the population is
not covered, because these individuals are insured in
other EU Member States (e.g. in Slovakia, this is 2.4 % of
population [22]).
Financial protection
Financial protection data that differentiates between
contributors and non-contributors is not available.
Therefore, this and the following sub-section also assess
data differentiated along income quintiles, although
non-contributors cannot be simply equated with low in-
come quintile population groups. Nonetheless, looking
Table 7 Benefit package





care, inpatient and outpatient
care, list of prescribed drugs,
selected dental procedures [56]
Same [56]
Czech Republic Comprehensive: outpatient
and inpatient care, prescription




Estonia Comprehensive: family doctor
services, inpatient and outpatient
specialist care, long-term care,
rehabilitation, prescribed drugs [39]
Same [16]
Hungary Comprehensive: primary care,
secondary and tertiary care, drugs,
selected dental care services [17]
Same [17]
Poland Comprehensive: primary health
care, outpatient specialist care,
hospital treatment, psychiatric care
and addiction treatment, certain
dental care services, drugs [18]
Same [18]
Slovakia Comprehensive: inpatient and
outpatient care, selected drugs,
basic dental care services [22]
n/a
Slovenia Comprehensive: primary, secondary
and tertiary services, drugs, medical
devices, costs of travel to health
facilities [23]
Same [23]
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at income quintile differences helps revealing inequities
across the whole population.
Table 10 summarizes data on OOP expenditure. The
OOP health expenditures as share of THE vary across
the analysed countries, ranging from 12 % in Slovenia to
28 % in Hungary, which is very low in global compari-
son. Only in Poland did this share decrease, and in
Croatia and Estonia only very marginally, since the
introduction of the SHI system including its government
revenue transfers. Data regarding the share of OPPs as
household expenditure by income quintile or decile is
only available for a few countries. In the Czech Republic,
OOPs are low and distributed relatively even across
household income deciles, in contrast to Estonia,
Hungary and Slovakia, where financial protection of low
income quintiles is a real concern.
Data to reveal changes and disaggregation in the inci-
dence of catastrophic and impoverishing expenditure is
scarce (Table 11). In Hungary, both indicators show
a slight improvement, so does the incidence for
impoverishing expenditure in Poland. In contrast, in the
Czech Republic, incidence of catastrophic expenditure
increased slightly, whereas in Estonia, it is fluctuating
with no clear trend, while its incidence of impoverishing
expenditure for the two bottom income quintiles seems
to go down over the recent years.
Access to and utilization of health care services
Table 12 provides data on utilization rates of health ser-
vices across countries. Utilization rates of general practi-
tioners (GP) services are equitable along income quintiles
in 3 out of 7 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovenia). With respect to dental care, utilization rates are
equitable in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, while in
Croatia, Estonia, Hungary and Poland there is some in-
equity, with high-income people being advantaged.
In 2012, in all countries, except Slovenia where data is
not available, within the poorest income quintile, the per-
centage of people reporting unmet needs for medical
examination is higher in comparison to better-off
Table 8 Cost-sharing arrangements
Country Co-payments/coinsurance/benefit ceiling Groups exempted from cost-sharing
Croatia Co-payments for inpatient and outpatient hospital services
(20 % of price), dental services (20 % of price), primary care,
prescribed drugs
Children, pregnant women, people living below the
poverty line are exempted from co-payments [28]
Price cap for all co-payments [28]
Czech Republic Co-payments for dental care, medical aids, and some prescribed
drugs
Children and adolescents up to the age of 18 years
are exempted from user fees for doctor visits [24]
User fees for doctor visits, hospitals stays, prescription drugs and
the use of outpatient services outside the regular office hours
(annual ceiling per insured individual)
Children and adolescents up to the age of 18 and people older than
65: lower annual ceiling [24]
Estonia Co-payments for outpatient specialist care (if contracted by health
insurance), inpatient care, prescription drugs, prescribed drugs,
dental care (except tooth preservation)
n/a
Co-insurance for specific inpatient care services set by the Estonian
Health Insurance Fund [16, 40]
Hungary Co-payments and co-insurance for drugs, medical aids and prostheses,
balneotherapy, dental prostheses, treatment in sanatoria, long-term
chronic care, some ‘hotel’ aspects of inpatient services
n/a
Co-payments for non-referral specialist services, except in emergency
cases; co-payments for services beyond the doctor’s recommended
treatment [17]
Poland Cost-sharing for drugs, certain dental procedures and material, certain
health resort services
Veterans with disabilities and their spouses if they are
dependant, veterans’ widows or widowers if they are
entitled to a survivor’s pension are exempted from
co-payment [18]Co-payments for orthopaedic devices [18]
Slovakia User fees for prescriptions (drugs, medical devices) and various health
services beyond primary and secondary outpatient care and inpatient
care.
People with disabilities and children under 6 years are
exempted from co-payments [54]
Co-payments for drugs, sanatoria treatment and transport to health
service [22]
Slovenia Co-payments for visits to GP, specialists, hospitals and laboratories for
the use of services covered by the Health Insurance Institute of
Slovenia [23]
Children, unemployed individuals, those with income
below a certain threshold and chronically ill people are
exempted from co-payments [23]
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people. Among the reasons, unaffordability (too expen-
sive), too long distance to travel or long waiting lists
are mentioned [38].
In the Czech Republic and Hungary, when it comes to
utilization rates and access to health services of specific
population groups, the Roma are disadvantaged com-
pared to non-Roma (see last column of Table 12). More-
over, in Poland, the poorest uninsured people receive
mostly inpatient care and they have limited access to
primary care or dental services in practice [37].
Discussion
This section examines the plausible effects of the insti-
tutional design features on performance, i.e. progress
towards UHC.




Population groups among which
some individuals are more likely
not to be enrolled





Croatia 98.4 % [58] n/a 64 %b [28] 65%b n/a 2008
Czech Republic 99.9 %b Individuals from the Roma ethnic
group [33]
58 % [19, 31] 58 % [19] 100 % 2011
Estonia 93.9 % [59] Long-term unemployed 4.9 %b (2011) [27] 5.3 %b (2011) [27] n/a 2014
Men that do not belong to the
economically active population
between 30 and 50 years [36]
Hungary 96.0 % [59] Individuals from the Roma ethnic group [34] n/a n/a n/a 2013
Poland 91.6 % [59] Poor n/a n/a n/a 2013
Homeless
Children of uninsured parents
Youngsters kept in holding facilities [37]
Slovakia 94.6 % [59] Individuals from the Roma ethnic group [35] 61.5 %b (2011) [26] 63.5 %b (2011) [26] n/a 2013
Slovenia 100 % [59] n/a n/a n/a n/a 2013
aData taken from OECD, if not otherwise indicated
bAuthors’ calculations based on data from countries’ Statistical Office or Health Insurance Fund reports
Table 10 OOP expenditure
Country OOPs as % of THEa [48] OOP expenditure as a share of household expenditure by income quintile/decile
(in the year after the introduction of
the government budget transfers)
(in 2013)
Croatia 13.5 (1995)b 12.5 OOPs represent a heavy burden for some financially most vulnerable groups [50]
Czech
Republic
5.2 (1993) [60] 15.7 Low OOPs distributed relatively evenly across household income decile [24]
Estonia 19.9 (2000) 18.9 People from lower quintiles spent proportionally more than those from higher
quintiles. OOPs of 1st quintile almost exclusively spent on medicines. 5th quintile
spent more on medicines and outpatient care.
1st income quintile: households with individuals 65 years or older or with disabilities
or chronic diseases face an increasing risk of relatively high expenditure [16]
Hungary 10.9 (1991) [52] 27.5 2008:
1st income quintile: 7.3 % of income spent on OOPs (compared to 6.1 % in 2005)
5th income quintile: 2.5 % of income spent on OPPs (compared to 2.2 % in 2005) [43]
Poland 29.9 (2000) 22.8 n/a
Slovakia 11.5 (1995) 22.1 Increase in OOPs due to user fee introduction and higher co-payments in 2003
affected the poor much more than the wealthy [22]
Slovenia 11.2 (1995)c 12.2 n/a
aData taken from the Global Health Expenditure Database
bData for 1994 was not found and the Global Health Expenditure Database provides data starting with 1995
cData for 1993 was not found and the Global Health Expenditure Database provides data starting with 1995
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Effects of eligibility and targeting
Overall, all countries have both a very high total popula-
tion enrolment rate as well as a high share of the exempt
and non-contributors. These countries achieve practic-
ally universality in population coverage. This is despite
the fact that there are large shares of the population out-
side formal sector employment, which in the logic of a
“traditional” compulsory SHI would be the principle
entry point for coverage. Yet, eligibility of the exempt is
defined both broadly as well as specifically to capture
those outside formal sector employment. High popula-
tion coverage rates are effectively achieved by primarily
applying an indirect targeting approach. Most important
seems the inclusion of the (unregistered) unemployed,
which captures a large part of those outside formal
sector employment. However this is not the case in
Poland, Slovenia and Estonia for the long-term
employed. On the other hand, these countries have not
chosen to "automatically" enrol all those outside the for-
mal sector, possibly to avoid informality becoming at-
tractive. As a result, population coverage is not 100 % in
that some few population groups and individuals remain
uncovered. In sum, the specific definition of eligible
groups for exemption is decisive for the level of popula-
tion coverage. Interestingly, in most countries (Croatia,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), children are
part of the state insured and their coverage is financed
through government budget transfers, even though fam-
ily insurance is in place in all the 7 countries studied
here. This reduces in principle the degree of cross-
Table 11 Incidence of catastrophic and impoverishing expenditure
Country % of households faced with catastrophic expenditure % of households faced with impoverishing expenditure
Croatia 2009: 7.6 % [61] n/a




(at a threshold of 5 % of net income) [63]
Estonia 2000-2007: Approx. 2-4 % [16] 2000: 3.7 %
2009: 1.6 % [61] 2007: 2.1 % [36]
Threshold of 40 %: For the 1st quintile:
2000: 1.8 % 2000: 4.6 %
2001: 1.9 % 2001: 4.6 %
2002: 2.1 % 2002: 5.7 %
2003: 2.1 % 2003: 5.8 %
2004: 3.0 % 2004: 8.4 %
2005: 2.8 % 2005: 3.5 %
2006: 4.4 % 2006: 7.8 %
2007: 2.3 % 2007: 4.6 % [42]
2010: 1.8 % 2010-2012 average for the 1st quintile: approx. 3 %
2011: 1.4 % 2000-2007: approx. 5 % of single pensioners pushed below
poverty line due to OOPs (compared to approx. 1 % in
2010–2012) [64]2012: 2.1 % [64]
Hungary 2003: 0.7 % 2003: 0.2 %
2007: 0.5 % [17] 2007: 0.1 % [17]
Poland From 2000 to 2009: Incidence and intensity of catastrophic
expenditure in drugs increased and affected for most the poor [65]
2000: 2.4 %
2009: 1.4 %
2009: 1.6 % [61] 63 % of the poor had drug expenditure and were
further impoverished
37 % of people fell into poverty due to drug
expenditure [65]
Slovakia Mean incidence of catastrophic health expenditure arising
from OOPs: 0.6 % [66]
n/a
Slovenia 2009: 0.1 % [61] n/a
Vilcu and Mathauer International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:7 Page 15 of 19
subsidization among contributors. It also further blurs the
line between coverage of family dependents and otherwise
vulnerable population groups financed through govern-
ment budget transfers.
Yet, there are gaps in health insurance coverage of cer-
tain groups, and thus countries are undertaking efforts
to reach these unreached groups. In Estonia, for ex-
ample, since the end of 2002, individuals who might
otherwise remain uninsured can acquire voluntary
coverage when meeting the following eligibility criteria:
Estonian residents who receive a pension fund from an-
other country and individuals who are not currently eli-
gible, but who have been members of the Estonian
Health Insurance Fund for at least 12 months in the two
years prior to applying for voluntary membership, as
well as their dependents (students and people temporar-
ily out of work but not registered as unemployed) [16].
In Poland, although people with low income are eli-
gible for exemption, there are still uninsured poor
individuals [37]. A reason for this might be the income
threshold set by the authorities to establish the eligibility
of individuals to be exempt. Despite being eligible, some
groups such as the children of uninsured parents and
homeless were not eligible for mandatory membership
and did not have the capacity to pay contributions to
join the system voluntarily before 2007. Therefore, deci-
sion makers tried to identify those population groups of
excluded people in order to provide access to care and
coverage to them.
Effects of financing and pooling arrangements
The analysed health systems are strongly based on
solidarity. Importantly, all countries have avoided frag-
mentation and allow for risk pooling by having established
an integrated fund for both the exempted and the contrib-
utors. Moreover, the levels of state budget transfers are
substantial in all countries, and found to be relatively high
in Hungary and Slovakia for which data is available. State
Table 12 Utilization rates and unmet needs
Country Equity between income
quintiles
Inequities for lower income quintiles Inequities for specific groups
Croatia n/a Lower utilization rates for GP, specialist
and dentist visits [44]
n/a
Higher share of unmet needa (2012, [38])
Czech Republic Similar utilization rates for GP,
specialist and dentist visitsb
(2008, [67])
Higher share of unmet needa (2012, [38]) 44 % of Roma and 11 % of non-Roma
population had no access to essential
drugs. 87 % of Roma and 99 % of
non-Roma population had access to
health services (2011, [33])
Estonia n/a Inequities in access to primary and dental
care, but declining (2004–2008, [36])
n/a
Higher share of unmet needa (2012, [38])
For services requiring user charges (outpatient
drugs, dental care) there are more inequalities
in utilization by income level compared to
services with little need for OOPs (inpatient
care, emergency care) (2000–2007, [36])
Hungary Equity in the probability of
seeing a GP (2009, [67])
Inequity in utilization rates for dentist and
specialist visitsb (2009, [67])
Roma were less likely to use health
services, particularly those offered by
specialist and dentists. The use of health
services by Roma was similar to that seen
in the lowest income quintile of the general
population. (2007, [17])
Higher share of unmet needa (2012, [38])
Poland n/a Higher share of unmet needa (2012, [38]) n/a
Inequity in utilization rates for GP and dentist
visitsb (2009, [67])
Slovakia n/a Inequity in utilization rates for GP visitsb (2009, [67]) n/a
Higher share of unmet needa (2012, [38])
Slovenia Equity in access and utilization
rates [23]
n/a n/a
Equity in utilization rates for GP,
specialist and dentist visitsb
(2007, [67])
aInformation regarding the share of unmet need is from Eurostat
bData on utilization of health care services by income level is adjusted for need
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budget transfers are calculated on the basis of minimum
wage, average wage or unemployment benefits or another
defined amount, unless they represent a fixed amount of
the budget. In general, unemployment benefits or the
minimum wage are much smaller than the average wage,
and thus using the average wage as assessment base leads
to higher per capita budget transfers and potentially lower
internal cross-subsidization. This also determines the level
of equity in financing as well as the fund’s financial
sustainability.
For example, in Slovakia, state budget transfers amounted
to about one third of total revenues of the SHI system,
while about two thirds of the population are exempted
(data for 2009, [22]). The Slovak SHI system is thus
strongly based on cross-subsidization of contributors. Like-
wise in Estonia, there is a very high level of cross-
subsidization within the pool where almost half of the in-
sured population contribute, whereas state budget transfers
are made for around 5 % of the population, whilst the rest
of the insured is cross-subsidized from within the pool,
with everybody being entitled to the same benefit package
[39]. Thus, in the long run, the system’s financial fairness
and sustainability might be threatened since the revenues
largely come from contributions of the working population.
In addition, the population is ageing and the share of work-
ing age individuals is decreasing [16]. Despite the recom-
mendations by the Estonian Health Insurance Fund and
WHO’s specialists in 2009 to extend the public revenue
base, i.e. apply the social tax to non-wage income and to
introduce government budget transfers on behalf of pen-
sioners [40], the Estonian Government did not choose to
implement this reform option [41].
Effects of benefit package design
The benefit package design and, equally important, the
cost-sharing mechanisms determine the degree of finan-
cial protection and utilization of health care services. In
fact, in most countries (Croatia, Estonia, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia), there is inequity in access for
lower income quintiles. In all of these countries, this is a
result of unaffordable co-payments, especially for pre-
scribed drugs, with the low income people being the
most affected [18, 22, 36, 42–44].
After the transition and the shift to the new financing ar-
rangement, combining SHI contributions and state budget
transfers, OOPs increased in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovakia and Slovenia (Table 10) as a result of high
utilization or overutilization of health care services
[16, 17, 22, 24]. Hungary and Slovakia tried to manage
utilization by introducing cost-sharing mechanisms
[17, 22], but they were not successful in reducing
over-utilization. In contrast Slovenia increased co-
payments with only a small impact on access to health
care and financial protection [21, 23], moreover since
a policy on voluntary health insurance helped to cover
user charges [45].
In Poland, uninsured poor individuals have free access
to publicly financed services, yet this does not solve the
challenge that poor people have no means to buy drugs
for example, and thus, even if not always necessary, they
prefer hospitalization care, where drugs are included.
Conclusions
This paper explored the trends and patterns of institu-
tional design aspects of the existing financing arrange-
ments, that is the mix of compulsory SHI contributions
and state budget transfers with a focus on population
groups outside formal sector employment and especially
vulnerable population groups. Notably, the analysis re-
vealed more commonalities than differences across
countries. First of all, in all countries, vulnerable groups
are fully exempted from paying contributions. The main
challenge here is to ensure that the amount of transfers
in combination with payroll contributions as a function
of taxation policy are sufficient and allow for sustainabil-
ity of the health insurance system in the long run.
Second, all countries avoided fragmentation by having
established integrated pools for both the exempted and
contributors. This allowed for risk pooling and strong re-
distributive capacity. Additionally, coverage is mandatory
for both the exempted and the contributors with no opt
out option of the system, with the exception of a few con-
tributing groups in Estonia and Poland.
Third, the benefit packages are relatively comprehensive
and, more importantly, all insured individuals, exempted
as well as contributing, are entitled to the same benefit
package. In most countries, this is combined with exemp-
tions from cost-sharing for several, though not all,
exempted groups. Concerns, though, remain for some of
the vulnerable groups specifically that are not exempted
from cost-sharing, and options need to be found such that
they do not face difficulties in access to and utilization of
health care services.
In terms of progress towards UHC, all countries have a
very high total population enrolment rate (above 90 %).
Yet, there are still groups not eligible for exemption and
immediate measures within the same exemption logic
should be taken in this regard. There are also challenges
with respect to financial protection, because in half of the
countries (Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia), lower in-
come quintiles face a heavy burden of OOPs.
Further research should be conducted to analyse the im-
pact of these arrangements with respect to UHC progress
on the basis of which to explore options how to improve
coverage, especially for vulnerable groups. Governments
should take further steps in better defining, identifying and
exempting the potential vulnerable groups (e.g. the very
poor, unregistered unemployed). Another question is how
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they can address the issue of system sustainability. More-
over, differentiated data for the exempt versus contributors,
insured versus uninsured, and across income quintiles is
needed. Providing answers to all these questions may help
countries to deepen their achievements in UHC.
Overall, this analysis suggests that the government rev-
enue transfer arrangements for selected and in particular
vulnerable groups who are exempt from contributions,
have been an effective way to set up a social health insur-
ance that avoided coverage gaps for those outside the for-
mal sector. This mixed financing system has thus made it
possible to largely maintain their population coverage level
after the system transition. Together with country experi-
ences from other regions, it confirms that this approach of
exempting vulnerable groups from contributions, or as
termed elsewhere their subsidization, is one option to pro-
gress towards universal health coverage, contingent upon
conducive institutional design.
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